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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relative strengths of particularism and generalism in the area of 
meta-ethics in philosophy, utilising justice as a case study. More specifically, this thesis 
examines the claims of Jonathan Dancy in his book on moral particularism, Ethics 
Without Principles (2004), that one can construct a moral philosophy without reference to 
any general principles, or invariant reasons. His book is primarily a study of reasons, and 
this thesis also presents a study of reasons through the eyes f both the particularists and 
the generalists. At its core, the particularism holds holism to be true in the theory of 
reasons, whereas generalism, at its core, holds atomism to be true in the theory of 
reasons. In my thesis I find that the strongest form of atomism and the strongest form of 
generalism is Rossean generalism. I conclude that these two pictures combined provide a 
superior account of what reasons are and how they work than Dancy's particularism. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
i 
In contemporary meta-ethics there are various ways in which the moral is explained and 
criticized. That is, what is central to ethics is widely contentious. It is argued by some 
that what is central to ethics is the concept of moral reasons. This argument stems from 
the point that all actions stem from reasons of some form. Or, at least for some, what is 
fundamental to a correct understanding of all moral terrain is what constitutes that which 
we ought to do. 
It is widely held that moral reasons determine what we ought to do. Moral reasons can be 
picked out as central in moral terrain because they can be part of any explanation of an 
ethical theory. That is if we want to understand what is right, or good, or just, etc., we 
need to understand what it means to have a reason to do something that is in line with 
these concepts. 
What constitutes a reason is even more contentious than what is central to ethics. That is, 
there is a vast array of theories and theorists who try to capture and explain exactly what 
reasons are. Very few of these theories agree to the extent that we can say that there is 
only one way to view reasons. More importantly very few of them agree about what 
moral reasons are at all. 
One of these theories is particularism. Particularism is a theory about how reasons work; 
it explains reasons as "case-specific" and "variant". Case specific means that from case to 
case reasons do not necessarily hold the same valence, rather, what is a reason in one case 
is not necessarily a reason in all cases, thus reasons vary from case to case. From 
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particularism we are urged to see that we have no need for principles as central parts of 
moral reasoning. 
Particularism is at one end of the philosophical spectrum, and generalism is at the other. 
Generalism, at its most trenchant, is a theory which relies on a reasonable supply of 
moral principles to govern and explain moral judgement and reasoning. That is, for the 
generalist what is a reason in one case must be a reason, on the same side, as in others. 
Particularism and generalism are in stern conflict because of the central view of reasons 
which each of them respectively holds. At the core of particularism is holism in theory of 
reasons. At the core of generalism is atomism in the theory of reasons. Holism in the 
theory of reasons, at its most basic form, holds that reasons change their valence case to 
case, they are variant. Atomism in the theory of reasons, at its most basic, holds that 
reasons do not change their valence, they are invariant. 
This paper heads straight into the conflict between generalism and particularism and 
between atomism and holism. That is, I want to explore the limitations of each of these 
theories and see what it is exactly that makes the two so completely incompatible. 
I find that at the helm of each are: Jonathan Dancy for particularism and David Ross for 
generalism. These are the two most influential yet conflicting theories in the area of 
practical reasons. Both defend their relative positions and I evaluate and make reference 
to each of these throughout this paper. 
D 
Along the way, I will refer to justice, as this is, along with reasons, the other central 
theme of this paper. This is because I think that it is one the most important principles 
that is generally held. Because of the importance we give justice; I think that we need to 
be able to account for justice from a theory of moral reasons in order to make sense of 
moral terrain. Sadly, justice only plays a direct role right at the end of this paper. 
The time before this final chapter is spent evaluating generalist and atomistic pictures of 
the moral terrain and moral reasons and particularist and holistic pictures of moral terrain 
and moral reasons. Where I put the two head to head, at the end of the particularism 
chapter, I find that we can accept and defend an atomistic picture of reasons with the help 
of cluster atomism (the theory that holds reasons as clusters of all the relevant features of 
the case combined). 
I then use the cluster atomistic picture to strengthen the theory of prima facie duties set 
out by David Ross. This provides me with a view that can arguably refute the claims 
made against generalism and atomism by Jonathan Dancy. 
I aim to conclude that with the help of a cluster atomistic picture of reasons, we can 
defend a generalist position which holds Ross' prima facie duties, from the arguments of 
particularists like Dancy. I also aim to conclude that by reducing reasons to features that 
count in favour of action, Dancy's particularism goes too far. It leaves out all the other, 
important, relevant features of the case which play a huge role inside the reason. Dancy's 
particularism leaves us with a relatively thin understanding of how reasons work. 
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Chapter II: Generalism 
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In order to get to grips with what is going on in the debate between generalism and 
particularism, I will aim first at defining the theory of generalism as it stands in regard to 
meta-ethics. The best way of explicating this theory of generalism is to create something 
resembling an overview. This will start with an explanation of how we generally view 
moral judgement pre-philosophically, followed by a brief description of philosophical 
generalism. 
In order to build generalism up to its most plausible and defendable position, I will move 
between two extremes, these being Kantianism and the position exemplified by David 
Ross. Here I do not intend on taking each of these on, unless necessary, or arguing for or 
against each. I am merely discussing the options that lie before us in such a way that we 
can see which are the most plausible and thus which ones we need to take seriously. This 
disclaimer aside, I think that this path should be intuitively clear. I will move from 
Kantian generalism to the generalism of Hare (the subsumptive option) and finally, to the 
generalism of Sir David Ross. 
It is uncontentious to claim that much of our pre-philosophical judgement of moral 
terrain is held in regards to a relatively primitive understanding and constitution of, moral 
principles. That is, we hold general principles which are verdictive1 towards certain 
practices, ideas and, amongst other things practical reasons". For example: 'Stealing is 
wrong', Tying is wrong', 'pre-marital sex is wrong'. These basic principles (obviously 
varying from person to person), influence and effectively govern the way in which we 
1 To pass judgment on certain practices or actions. 
" Reasons for actions. 
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make decisions, whether these are moral decisions or other trivial day to day sorts of 
decisions. 
This is uncontentious, because we have various social institutions which are set up to 
protect and enforce these principles, depending on what each individual holds central. For 
example, there is a distinct variety of separate religions each with its own moral codeJ. 
These religions generally teach and explain, universally , what is right and what is wrong. 
The thought is, when agents are faced with decisions, they can apply various principles to 
these decisions and deliberate their way to a final decision. Thus much of our pre-
philosophical intuitions must generally align with this method when answering questions 
about what reasons are and what it is right to do. These intuitions are the basis for 
philosophical generalism. 
Generalism 
Generalism (philosophically speaking) is a blanket term, which covers many 
philosophical positions. That is there is one underlying thought behind many positions. I 
am not going to delve into each of these, only the ones which are important for my 
purposes. The main task here is to explicate the general underlying concepts that unify 
these positions under this blanket term of generalism. 
J By moral code I mean 'hierarchy of principles'. 
4 At a very basic level a principle is held to be true, and it is held as a universally truth, and therefore what 
is right and wrong must similarly be held as universally true, I will get back to this concept later. 
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Before I start to talk about reasons (this is the main topic which we are reviewing), it is 
important to realise that generalists do not specifically talk in terms of reasons. The most 
important and central feature of the view is that it hinges on the having and acceptance of 
principles. Thus generalism does not look at reasons unless they have to, due to criticism 
as we shall see. So under normal circumstances, for the generalist, where an agent ought 
to do something or is obligated to do something, it is because she has a moral principle 
that directs her towards this action. 
A moral principle is usually a statement or proposition of the form: 'Promises ought to be 
kept' or 'One ought never to steal', that is they are completely verdictive. Moral 
principles are held as what the agent should do or is most obligated to do. A principle 
mandates some respective action in every case it occurs, due to its invariance (not acting 
by a present principle is to do something morally wrong). 
Generalism holds that principles are invariant. For generalism, a principle will always 
stand in the same relation to action. If a principle is present in a case, it will always 
demand the same action. This means that, for generalism where they are forced to look at 
reasons due to criticism of the lack of specific talk of reasons, reasons do not change their 
valence. Where a feature of a case is concurrent with an invariant principle that demands 
a specific action, that same feature will always work with that same principle and demand 
that same action. Thus, for the generalist reasons, in the same manner as principles, must 
be invariant and univalent towards obligating some action. 
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The invariance and univalence of principles that generalism holds is thus held with a 
concurrent view of reasons: Atomism. Atomism holds reasons as invariant, that is UA 
feature which is a reason in one case must remain a reason, and retain the same polarity, 
in any other"'\ Generalists hold atomism in the theory of reasons to be true, or at least, 
they are atomists with regards to the role that reasons play in moral decision making and 
judgement. In fact, generalists must be atomists, they cannot hold that reasons behave 
differently from case to case because this would mean that principles do not hold case to 
case. This is due to the strict invariance that generalism holds in regards to principles. 
The leading thought here is, if principles are invariant and univalent, then reasons too 
must follow this pattern. 
We can follow generalism and its counterpart atomism to the view held by Immanuel 
Kant. 
Kant's Generalism 
Immanuel Kant is a good example of this basic form of generalism, for him, there were 
various activities which were always without exception wrong, such as lying, promise-
breaking and suicide. For Kant these acts could never be justified, meaning no moral 
principle could justify these actions in such a way that they could be seen as right. Kant's 
generalism is epitomised in the form of the Categorical Imperative: "Act only on that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law". This is, for Kant, the absolute moral principle. 
3 Dancy, J Ethics Without Principles pg 7. 
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So what is important in Kant's absolute moral principle that provides us insight into 
generalist theories? First off, there is one over arching principle by which we must make 
all of our moral decisions, this being that we may only act, to act rightly, in accordance 
with a principle which states: Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law. Where we find a principle through this, 
maybe "Breaking a promise is wrong". It is wrong because we could not accept that 
promise breaking could become a universal law. More noticeably if we find that promise 
breaking is always wrong, it will be wrong in all circumstances and therefore invariant 
and univalent. This shows us that Kantian generalism is too a subscriber to atomism. 
It is not hard to establish that Kant's generalism can lead us to a variety of invariant 
principles, or activities which are always wrong. Each of these will demand in every case, 
that certain activities will never be promoted or right. Wherever you act in a way that 
could not be accepted as a universal law you are doing something wrong. Once this 
method shows something to be right or wrong, it will always be right or wrong. 
For example: "I should not purposefully vomit after every meal". If vomiting after every 
meal became a universal law then everyone in the world would die of malnutrition, or 
other bulimic related illnesses. As per the above paragraph: once the categorical 
imperative has shown something to be wrong (vomiting after every meal), it must always 
hold as wrong. Thus vomiting after every meal can never be justified or right, under any 
circumstances. 
10 
Kant's work shows one extreme of generalism, it is very strict in its application to ethics 
and in its application to the study of reasons. The problem with the strictness of this form 
of generalism is that the principles it utilises are decisive "Which means that even if more 
than one principle could apply to a given case, they must all recommend the same 
thing"6. Meaning that if there are a variety of principles in the same case for this kind of 
general approach to work, all of these principles must mandate the same action. This is 
because if these principles are equal in strength7, they will lead to a conflict of 
commitments or a moral dilemma. Both of these are something that Kant cannot account 
for. The lack of this account provides a variety of problems for Kantian generalism. 
This translates into a powerful attack on Kant's extreme generalism. It would be foolish 
to accept a theory that only works in cases where there is only one principle, or where 
there is more than one principle they must all recommend the same action. On the first 
count, it is only in very menial cases where there is only one principle directing us 
towards the right option. These cases are few and far between. What we are looking for is 
a theory that can explain all cases and can give us an explanation and an account of why 
certain actions are right and wrong, and not merely express an overall verdict. A theory 
which works best under circumstances where there is only one principle in a case will not 
do. 
6 Dancy, J Ethics without Principles, pg 5. 
7 weight or normative force. 
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The reason I say that Kantian generalism works best where there is only one principle 
directing the agent, is because where there are two or more principles in the case they 
must all recommend the same thing. I can hardly deny that on some occasions this is 
possible. At least, each of these principles might not directly recommend the same thing, 
however each might be upheld or not undermined by the same thing. This leads me to my 
second count against Kant. Without too much effort, we can think of examples where 
principles demand separate, conflicting options in the same case. We cannot say that this 
agent has muddled her commitments and we cannot say that possibly, one or more of 
these principles do not apply to the case. I turn to the well-known example of Sophie's 
choice. 
In a Jewish concentration camp in the second world war, a mother (Sophie) is forced by a 
guard to choose between the lives of her children. One can live, the other must go to the 
gas chamber. Sophie must choose one or they both die. 
In this example, Sophie has two separate principles which are guiding her. The principle 
to protect the life of her son and the principle to protect the life of her daughter. Clearly, 
these principles cannot promote the same thing and clearly both apply to the case. To 
claim that the principles of the case must recommend the same thing must end up in one 
of the principles recommending the death of the child whose life it demands protection. 
Clearly something must be amiss. 
The possibility that this type of approach can lead us to these situations is enough to 
reject its use. Kant's generalism demands some very strict commitments Thankfully for 
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generalism, we do not need to go so far. There is no room for conflict of principles of any 
sort within this theory. That is, it is not hard to envisage principles which might conflict 
even under the categorical imperative and thus which obligate different actions. An agent 
could be in a case where, by the categorical imperative, they ought to x and they ought to 
y however they cannot x and y at the same time. 
Hare's Generalism 
The underlying thought behind Hare's generalism is that to account for concepts like 
ought, we need to subscribe to some form of subsumptive rationality8. To do this we 
must, to be consistent, subsume particular cases under general principles in the same way. 
This is done with the aim of making the concepts of what is right and what is wrong 
consistent with previous verdicts in similar cases. 
So, where I hold a principle which obligates me not to lie, I will subsume all cases in 
which I might lie under this principle. I will thus not lie, because of the overarching 
invariant principle: "Lying is wrong". If this view is held it is supposed to make reasons 
and principles consistent. That is, if we subsume all similar cases under principles which 
suit the case, our judgements and decisions (be they moral or otherwise) will be 
consistent. 
That what holds in one place will hold in all places. 
9 "Lying is wrong." 
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Thus, subsuming cases under general principles is a view that is held to explain and 
sufficiently account for normativity10 such that we can be sure that we are doing the right 
thing as we did before, by appeal to a principle. If we ought always to act by our 
strongest principle, then acting by our strongest principle is always the right thing to do. 
This method is somewhat similar Kant's method of justification of principles by means of 
the categorical imperative. However, subsumption suggests that there must be more to 
understanding moral terrain than one over-arching absolute principle. The work done by 
Hare suggests that there must be a variety of principles under which cases are subsumed. 
Thus agents can therefore deliberate as to which principle(s) apply to the case . 
Another point we can sketch out about subsumption is that "our moral judgement (is) 
constrained by general principles each of which needs only one decision to set it up" . 
All that is needed for one to create a moral principle is what is right. So if I decide that 
getting to university five minutes before a lecture is right, in one case, then all future 
cases (where I have a lecture, or am making plans for some time before a lecture) must be 
subsumed under the new principle "getting to university five minutes before my lecture is 
right". So subsumption holds that where one moral decision is made by subsumption 
under a general moral principle it will hold in future cases as equally right. 
To explain this at best is by use of a moral example. George is a railway worker; he is 
committed to making sure that all trains arrive on time. One morning he has learned that 
10 The normative features of reasons. 
11 i.e. which principles to subsume the case under. 
'" Dancy, J Moral Reasons pg 82. 
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there is a strike, the other railway workers are demanding higher wages. George 
subsumes the case under a general principle "getting trains to arrive on time is right". He 
does not strike because he is committed to the principle and is committed to his job 
despite the lousy wage. This moral judgement has further ramifications. In future cases, 
George ought not to strike because this case has led to a principle: "striking when you 
should be working is wrong". This principle is one under which future cases will be 
subsumed. 
It follows then that generalism of this form leans on the assumption that subsumed 
principles must depend on some assumed moral truth, like "getting trains to arrive on 
time is right". If we look at this principle, it will only be true to someone who accepts and 
subsumes it as an important principle, or at least that acting in accordance with this 
principle is always the right thing to do. The view leans on the assumption that: "If a 
principle is true now, it must always be true. " This clause is held by the subsumption so 
that subsumed principles account for the normativity. 
My point is that if a principle was not held as true, or assumed to be true by the agent, 
then the principle could never account for an ought. This is because a principle can only 
account for an ought or mandate an action if it is has some normative force. Normative 
force (in this explanation) is that quality of a reason or principle that necessitates 
something. The normative force can only be present if the principle is true or assumed to 
be so by the agent. It is a key aspect of this explanation to see that as these principles are 
assumed to be true, or as long as they are held to be true, they will always hold the same 
lj McCloskey, H. J. Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics pg 97. 
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valence and normative force. That is, where "striking when you should be working is 
wrong" is held as a subsumed moral truth, rightness must always stand in the same 
relation to the principle: "striking when you should be working is wrong". 
Hare's view and method of explaining moral principles has its merits; even in this very 
basic form it makes some intuitive sense to hold principles as central to our moral 
decision making. If we subscribe to principles, then principles can easily say that x has 
reason to y, y is always obligatory, x ought to y. Of course, this gets more complicated. 
Up until now we have assumed that there will always be at least one principle in a given 
situation. But what happens where an agent faces two separate principles in the same 
situation: x ought to y and x ought to z? I am here speaking again about conflicting 
reasons. 
The answer is, in some cases, that an agent might be able to subsume a case under a 
variety of principles without much trouble. I might be able to subsume a case under 
various principles at the same time, such as the following: A principle not to break 
promises, a principle to tell the truth and a principle not to eat my friend's jelly donut 
when he is not looking. We can easily see how these principles could work for the same 
case, again, they would recommend the same thing. However, neither of these principles 
are in conflict. Therefore, we might think that subsumption stops conflict. But surely this 
cannot be the case. I must ask the question: does subsumption really get around or 
account for, conflicting principles? 
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The normal response from this basic form of generalism, as we have seen from Kant, is to 
say that there is no conflict of reasons, only faulty reasoning. Hare does not move far 
away from this response. For him, the conflict must be internal to the agent who has 
muddled her principles and as to which of them to subsume the case under. Again, we 
need to ask the question: is this enough? 
So let us test this theory with the same example from the previous section Sophie's 
choice. This time Sophie is faced with a conflict of commitments and must decide under 
which principle to subsume the case. We can hardly imagine that Hare, or any proponent 
of subsumption, can say that the agent has muddled which principles apply to the case. 
Which ever choice Sophie makes, she will be ignoring the other principle under which 
she is mandated to subsume the case. Clearly, subsumption cannot escape this example or 
other similar examples. Although it makes sense where there is only one principle, or 
where a case can be subsumed under two or more principles without conflict, 
subsumption will not do. 
Luckily, if we still want to be generalists, we do not need to go as far subsumption. There 
is a more accommodating option which can, or can at least attempt to, account for 
conflicting principles. This is highlighted in the work done by W.D. Ross where he 
formulates the theory of prima facie duties. This in my opinion is the superior form of 
generalism, as we shall see. It moves from verdictive absolute moral principles to 
principles of a contributory nature. These principles directly explain what we consider to 
be right and wrong. 
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Ross's Generalism 
This account allows for more than one principle to apply to each separate case. These 
principles are no longer absolute, because more than one may apply to a case. The idea is 
that each of these principles contributes towards some action or against some action. That 
is, these principles provide many reasons for action but in the end, contribute to an 
overall reason for action. These principles are called: "Contributory principles"14. 
At a very uncomplicated level these contributory principles 5 are still moral principles in 
themselves. They still function as principle-like statements. What is different here is that 
each one directly counts in favour, or disfavours, a specific action. Each of these 
contributory principles thus has their own normative strength, allowing that some can be 
more important than others in a situation. So an agent may be faced with a variety of 
options in a specific case yet be able to evaluate which action is more important. Each of 
the contributory principles will have its own normative strength or importance which may 
vary from to case; however, the valence of these principles never changes: lying will 
always be wrong. 
For Ross, the terms prima facie duties and duties proper refer to contributory principles 
and absolute principles respectively. Likewise, these terms function in replacement of 
14 Dancy, J Ethics without Principles, pg 5. 
13 This is not a representation of Ross per se, it is rather an explanation of how these principles are not 
absolute, they are contributory. 
16 Ross, D The Right and the Good, chapter 2. 
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that which you have reason to do: prima facie duties and, that which you have overall 
reason to do: duties proper. Overall reasons are where the normativity comes down; more 
simply, where the balance of reasons lies. 
Prima facie duties are similar to the above mentioned contributory principles. However, 
these operate in the form that there is always some reason to follow a principle like 
"promises must be kept", but they can be, in a way, overridden by other prima facie 
principles. This is because prima facie duties count in favour of action in different ways: 
"There is a principle that says 'be just', but that does not mean that all just actions are in 
fact right, it only means that the justness of an action counts in its favour"17. That does 
not necessarily mean that the principle 'be just' will always be the over all right thing to 
do or be the most important action in a specific case. 
In some cases there may be some other prima facie duty which is of higher strength; the 
balance of reasons then falls with that duty. Nevertheless, Ross promotes a view of prima 
facie duties which states that if a feature (of the case) counts in favour of action in one 
case, it will count in favour of action in all other similar cases. It is just that in some cases 
a feature may be less important than others. It will however contribute towards the 
overall reason in that case. 
This works where there are features of a case that promote pima facie duties with higher 
valence than others in the case. "For each morally relevant feature, there is a principle of 
17 Dancy, J, "Moral particularism", the Stanford Encyclopedia (Summer 2005 Edition), Edward N Zalta 
(ed), URL = <Http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/moral particularism/. 
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prima facie duty" . Take the example "lives ought be saved where possible" as opposed 
to "promises ought to be kept". Both are cases of prima facie duties. Features of the case 
provide us with each of these prima facie duties. As Ross would allow: if you can save a 
life by breaking a promise, then you ought to break the promise. "Lives must be saved" 
functions as the overall reason for action. This is because the balance of reasons 
lies in the action that promotes the saving of lives. This is important because it allows for 
cases where there may be an array of features which promote different reasons for 
actions. If we revise the previous case, it may be possible that the breaking of a promise 
would wound millions, yet still save a life. The balance of reasons then falls to keeping 
the promise. 
McCloskey views this relation between prima facie duties as follows: 
"Statements about what is always obligatory are in the form of principles of prima facie 
obligations. Thus principles which assert 'Elimination of pain is obligatory'... are 
asserting that all actions of this kind are obligatory 'unless relevantly different conditions 
prevail" 
This gives us a clue as to how prima facie duties function. Combined with Dancy's 
definition, certain features of a case relate to a relevant prima facie duty, each prima facie 
duty counts in favour of a specific action. However, each of these prima facie duties 
comes with a silent clause attached: "Unless relevantly different conditions prevail". That 
18 Dancy, J Ethics Without Principles pg 6. 
19 McCloskey, H.J. Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics pg 96. 
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is to say that, unless there are other prima facie duties with a higher valence which count 
in favour of a different action, this action is obligatory. 
From the previous example, we are now able to establish how this works: "promises must 
be kept" (unless relevantly different conditions prevail). Cue the relevantly different 
condition: a feature of the situation demands saving a life, but would mean breaking the 
promise. The principle of saving lives is more obligatory, it counts in favour of action 
more than keeping the promise. Thus it is the right thing to do. We now know that for 
future cases, where breaking a promise will save a life, breaking the promise is the right 
thing to do (unless there are further reasons to do something else). 
There are various important aspects of Ross's account of prima facie duties which we 
need to extract and discuss. First of all, as opposed to the previous forms of generalism, it 
appears that there has been a shift in the way that we should view principles. This view 
allows principles to be weaker or stronger in different cases. Although the valence 
doesn't change, the principles may be overridden yet still contribute to the overall 
practical reason of the case. Ross's generalism takes reasons seriously; reasons play a 
pivotal role in prima facie duties. However, valence and variance remain the same in line 
with atomism and thin moral terms" . These thin moral terms are evident where he sets 
out seven prima facie duties. (These will be evaluated in respect to the next step: 
particularism; this happens throughout the next two sections) 
Terms which do not add to the overall Tightness of the case over and above themselves. 
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* 
For the moment, Ross sets out seven prima facie duties in "The Right And The Good". In 
actuality he only sets out six, however, the first is split into two clauses a and b. I will 
count these as two separate prima facie duties in my adaptation of Ross's work. 
(1) Duties of Fidelity 
(2) Duties of Reparation 
(3) Duties of Gratitude 
(4) Duties of Justice 
(5) Duties of Beneficence 
(6) Duties of Self Improvement 
? 1 
(7) Duties of Non Malevolence 
We can say that these prima facie duties that Ross produces are thin moral terms. That is 
they do not specify anything more than that which they are, or they do not specify 
anything over and above what they claim. If I say that such and such is good, it does not 
specify anything over and above this point. Thus terms such as: good, right, wrong and 
Ross's seven prima facie duties: beneficence, malevolence, fidelity, reparation, justice, 
self-improvement and gratitude can be placed in this category. At this point however this 
does not pose a problem for Ross's generalism. The fact that Ross's prima facie duties 
are centred on thin moral terms, does not separate these duties from rightness. 
The view is far superior to the previous forms of generalism that we have seen. It has a 
variety of advantages above the generalism stemming from Hare and Kant. We can see, 
21 Ross, D. The Right and The Good pg 21. 
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firstly, that prima facie duties allow us to handle situations as they arrive. A case that we 
face that does not mirror any previous cases can be looked at through the seven prima 
facie duties. Ross implies that these will show us what is right to do in almost every 
moral decision. Ultimately they should lead us to rightness. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a 
situation where one of these seven prima facie duties will not play a role. Intuitively then, 
we must go with Ross. 
Secondly, the view escapes moral conflict without undermining one of the other 
principles in the case. This is because, in any case, one duty will appear intuitively more 
clear than another and we can thus, albeit unhappily, make a decision. The idea is that 
one principle will be of higher prima facie importance than others in that same case. This 
will not undermine the other principle because it is simply just not as important as the 
other in that particular case. As we can imagine, if one principle is of higher importance, 
then the conflict is resolvable. 
So, in Sophie's choice, one of her options would be re-enforced by some features, or 
reasons in the case. These reasons will contribute to the rightness of the case by showing 
one principle to be of higher importance and thus leaving the other out and leading 
Sophie to the right choice. This will be further enforced by the silent clause: unless 
relevantly different conditions prevail. This is because, for the principles in this case, 
relevantly different conditions do prevail. So, one of them will be more important than 
the other. 
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I think that Ross is the closest to the truth that we have seen so far. In this section we 
have seen how generalism varies between different extremes; each of these seem to 
capture some intuitions revolving what it is to act rightly with respect to reasons. At least 
the view gets stronger as we move from one option to the next. However, the main 
underlying thought behind generalism remains " The very possibility of moral thought 
and judgement depends on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles"". This 
applies to each of the forms we have seen; the necessity of moral principles, in whichever 
form, is central to the way in which each theory functions. We now move on to a view 
that completely rejects any principle: particularism. 
' Dancy, J Ethics without Principles, pg 7. 
24 
Section II: Particularism 
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In the previous section, we saw generalism move between two extremes, complete 
atomistic generalism in the form of Kantian principles and the categorical imperative to 
Ross's more accommodating prima facie duties. The difference between these two forms 
of generalism implicitly indicates that there are different levels of commitment between 
the two extremes. That is, where Kantian generalism relies heavily on a single invariant 
atomistic fundamental principle. Ross attempts to capture what reasons are by thinking of 
them in terms of their being principles of a sort: prima facie ones, at least reasons are 
allowed to behave somewhat differently case to case. We now move to a further extreme, 
particularism. 
The main thought behind particularism is that we do not need moral principles in order to 
judge what it is right to do, or to think about what is right. The move to particularism 
from any sort of generalism thus initially involves a complete rejection of the view that 
we can understand reasons as being like principles at all. This is because particularism is 
supposed to be the study of how moral reasons work: that is, how moral reasons work 
from case to case. 
This section is directly aimed at explicating the steps that are followed to get from 
generalism to particularism. To do this I will look closely at the way that particularism 
directly views reasons, because this view of reasons is supposed to lead us to a theory 
which accepts holism. I will look at this move to holism and how holism works because 
holism is supposed to lead us to full particularism. I will evaluate each of these steps and 
see if we can accept each of them. 
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As the leading contemporary proponent of particularism, Jonathan Dancy has provided an 
insightful look into particularism with his book "Ethics Without Principles". This section 
works closely with the explanations offered by the work done by Dancy. This is because 
his work highlights the most important aspects of particularism focusing mainly moral 
reasons. Reasons on the particularist view are contributory reasons, that is, they 
contribute towards the case for an action. Differently expressed, they count in favour of 
action. 
Contributory Reasons 
There can be a variety of reasons J in any case, reasons promoting different actions or the 
same action. Each reason contributes towards the case by the way in which it counts in 
favour of a specific action, or counts against a specific action. Thus, by each reason 
contributing towards the case; they make something of the case for action. 
I do not want to contend this. I agree, reasons can work differently from each other in the 
same case. I agree that each will count in favour of, or against a specific action because, 
this must be what reasons do: to count in favour of an action or to promote an action. I 
also agree that each feature that is a reason in a case must play a role in deciding what is 
the right thing to do in that case. For me, all reasons must be contributory. But do we 
need to be particularists to accept this view of reasons? The answer to this must clearly be 
no. 
2j Reasons, on this view, are features of the case which make something of the case for action. 
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If particularism is the truth, there must somewhere be a point where contributory reasons 
become a purely particularist concept rather than one which aligns with generalism. That 
is, at some point in the discussion we will hopefully see that contributory reasons can no 
longer be applied generally. We need to know whether we have to go as far as this point 
in order to fully accept contributory reasons. We need to know whether this point is one 
which is fundamental to contributory reasons. I hope that this point will be clear. For the 
moment, We need to see the fundamental concepts that surround this theory before we 
worry about whether we need to accept it or not. Again, the central theme on which all 
the steps to particularism hang is contributory reasons, so the concept of a contributory 
reason must be fleshed out. 
On the view promoted by Dancy, reasons24 combine in irregular ways, they are like rats, 
they can work on their own or together towards the same thing but also turn and fight 
each other. This analogy is purposeful; it shows that in any given case there is a range of 
actions, which we have some reason to do. However, before the interaction and 
combination of reasons is examined it must be noted that contributory reasons can have 
enough normative strength = to make the case for action on their own. That is, a 
contributory reason does not need other contributory reasons to be present in the same 
case in order for it to both function and count in favour of action such that it is enough for 
an agent to act on. 
From this point on; when referring to reasons I mean contributory reasons unless specified otherwise. 
Count strongly enough in favour of an action. 
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This is an important distinction to make about contributory reasons because if it is 
thought that they only work in combination with each other they seem weak. That is, they 
seem like they cannot be enough to count in favour of an action on their own such that 
they can get us to act. This weakness would make a possible view which holds 
contributory reasons vulnerable to objections by means of peculiar examples where only 
one reason does get us to act. 
A contributory reason, then, on its own, can be strong enough to get us to act. However 
this is not the usual case. In fact it is only in rather peculiar, trivial, circumstances in 
which one would only have one reason for doing something. So, in a normal case, 
reasons work together as a combination. Now that we have seen that contributory reasons 
work on their own we can move on to look at the way in which they work together. 
As Dancy explains: "Contributory reasons are reasons officially capable of doing what 
they do (favour or disfavour an action) either alone or in combination with others."" 
When reasons work in combination with others they do so because they are in the same 
case. Because each reason must play a role of some description in the case none are 
ignored, they must work together. 
It might be easier to think of each reason as being like a magnetized iron filings. Each 
side of the filing has a different polarity (valence) either positive (counting in favour of 
an action) or negative (opposing an action). Now each filing (reason) will attract or repel 
one object (action). Where it attracts one object it might repel or attract other objects at 
26 Dancy, J, Ethics Without Principles pg 15. 
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the same time. In each instance that a filing attracts or repels and object, it adds or 
subtracts to or from the polarity of that object. 
If we translate this into talk about reasons, we can see that each reason plays a role. Each 
reason adds normative force to the case, reasons push and pull us in different directions, 
if we are responsive to reasons. Contributory reasons combine in such a way that they 
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produce overall reason to do something. 
We do not need to be particularists yet. We could still use these reasons in conjunction 
with a set of principles. We might say that we are still able to subsume cases from 
previous a case. We might try to show that these reasons combine in the same way in 
every instance they occur because the valence of each reason never changes. Or, lastly, 
we might say that where these reasons combine they lead to overall reasons28. 
Particularists deny this because overall reasons are principle-like. That is, overall reasons 
are reasons that appear on the same side or always demand the same action, they are thus 
principle-like but not necessarily principles. For example, today is payday I should be 
smiling. This could be seen as an overall reason if I am a generalist, because that it is 
payday is always going to stand on the same side towards smiling, it is an overall reason. 
Particularists want something beyond principles; they want an approach that is devoid of 
principle-talk of any form. The particularist view of the way contributory reasons 
27 where the contributory comes down. 
28 Principles or duties, note this is distinct from overall reason foot note 7. 
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combine must thus be distinct from generalism and therefore key to understanding the 
way in which reasons are particular to each case. 
For the particularist, where contributory reasons combine they do so in peculiar ways. 
The peculiarity of the combination of reasons owes itself to the particular features of each 
separate case. The reasoning behind this is that if we look at each case it will only be in 
very, very trivial cases where two (or more) cases have exactly the same features which 
count in favour of acting. However, even if there are the same features in similar cases, 
Dancy urges us to see that the reasons might combine irregularly such that they promote 
a different action to the previous case. We have no reliable way of predicting that a future 
or present case will end in the same way that a previous one did. So, then, there is no 
reliable way to say that because I am in a situation similar to the one last week I will thus 
have reason to perform the same action, because we can identify very few case-to-case 
regularities in the way these reasons combine. 
Further explanation reveals that each contributory reason holds its own normative power 
(like the magnetic analogy). Each specific feature has a variable valence case to case29, 
the variability of which depends on other aspects surrounding each reason, or, in fact, 
other features of the case itself. However, the normative power or force that each reason 
possesses directly accounts for the rightness of the action in each case. For the 
particularist contributory reasons are normatively basicj0. Thus, for the particularist there 
29 This is where particularism differs; before the valence of each reason was invariable. 
j 01 do not want to go to deeply into this issue, I just want to point out that contributory reasons, for the 
particularist, are basic to all moral thinking. They are normatively basic because they cannot be explained 
in a way that is devoid of normative talk. 
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is no need to use principles or overall reasons to establish whether an action is right or 
wrong. Contributory reasons can account for this perfectly well. 
It is here that we need to decide where we stand. The prompt for this claim is that here 
the valence of reasons can vary from case to case. If this is necessary to carry on then 
those who accept generalism must proceed with caution. My point here is, maybe we can 
accept that with a view of contributory reasons we do not need principles (as we will see 
shortly) but maybe we can accept that even without principles, the valence of reasons do 
not vary. For the moment we need to see why particularism views reasons as features 
whose valence varies. 
The rationale behind this move by particularism is that overall reasons, principles etc... 
are purely verdictive, that is, they only specify approval or express that some general 
truth applies to the reason or the action. They do not explain why something is right and 
they cannot account for the rightness of the reasons because they come only after the 
reasons themselves. Overall reasons, thus, do not contribute to the rightness of the reason 
or to the rightness of an action. So the particularist urges us to see that we do not need 
overall reasons or principles. Contributory reasons do enough and they explain enough so 
that once we know them and how they work, we can do away with principles of any sort. 
Consider: when asked why should you do X? you can refer to a principle and say: 
because X is always right. As already established, principles do not account for the 
rightness they only pass verdict on an action. Claiming that a principle applies to a case 
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does not explain why X is right nor does it tell us that in fact, in this exact case, X is the 
right thing to do. To attack principles we need to go beyond accepting a universal truth, 
or a general truth. The point is, for the particularist, that rightness goodness etc, are 
particular to cases. A general principle will not do. 
If principles only pass judgment on what should be done, they are not the reason for the 
rightness or wrongness. Contributory reasons on the other hand have an advantage; they 
can directly explain the rightness or wrongness of what should be done, because they are 
the basic features of the case that make something right or wrong. 
The fundamental concept of contributory reasons is compounded by the idea that they 
can solely account for the rightness and wrongness of what you should do. Contributory 
reasons are thus not to be confused with overall reasons and principles. They are enough 
to provide sufficient reason for action. They do not need any form of general reasons to 
function in such a way that we know that we will be doing the right thing. However there 
is still not enough evidence to show that we have to be moral particularists. We might say 
that we can hold a view of contributory reasons that looks at each contributory reason as 
a contributory principle, like that of Ross's prima facie duties. Just because contributory 
reasons account for the rightness of what you should do is not enough for us to say that 
each case must have an unpredictable ending. Maybe we will find evidence to the 
contrary in Dancy's distinction between favourers and enablers. 
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Favourers and Enablers 
Favourers are features of the case that play the reason role: that it is raining outside 
favours me taking an umbrella when I leave the house. Enablers are features of the case 
that enable the favouring feature to favour something: That my promise was not made 
under duress enables my promise to count in favour of keeping it. 
This is an important distinction; these concepts play separate roles in Dancy's 
particularism. I think that the main reason for this is because it would be wrong to call 
something a reason that does not directly count in favour of action. If this distinction is 
ignored then features of the case that do not play the reason role will be placed in the 
same category as those that do. 
Dancy urges us that there are favourers and disfavourers, enablers and disablers. The role 
that each of these plays is as significant as it is complex. For a feature to be a reason it 
must make something of the case for action or count against making something of the 
case for action. An enabler is a something that allows other features to play the reason 
role, a disabler is something that disallows other features to play the reason role. 
Basically, favourers and disfavourers are features which play the reason role. This is 
either allowed by, or disallowed by enablers or disablers respectively. I will proceed with 
caution as it might be easy to confuse or agglomerate enablers and favourers. That is, 
their distinction must be clear. 
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This is not a foreign concept, we can easily imagine that, in order for feature S to favour 
an action there must be feature D which enables it to do so. That is to say, S will not 
count in favour unless D enables it to do so. This may seem a somewhat confused sort of 
example but it is not a hard task to put this into a case. 
"That my car is dirty" is a clear favourer for my washing it. In some places however, 
having a dirty car is fashionable, we will call this "fashion"31. So "that my car is dirty" is 
disabled by another feature of the case "fashion" such that: "that my car is dirty" no 
longer favours my washing it. Rather; "that my car is dirty" now favours something else 
maybe going to show of its extreme filthyness to all of my friends. 
We can imagine a converse of this example; "my car is dirty" and I want to sell it. Now 
we have an enabler, I want to sell it. I know that washing my car will make it seem more 
appealing to a would be buyer. So, "I want to sell it" enables my dirty car to favour 
washing it. 
Dancy explains that enablers and disablers apply to the favouring relation as well as the 
right-making relation. This is because we can easily imagine two conclusions to the 
initial example: "So I wash it" and "So I ought to wash it", for the converse: "So I don't 
wash it" and "So I ought not to wash it". The conclusions for each case suggest that 
enablers and favourers apply to both the favouring relation which will end in: "So I wash 
it" and "So I don't wash it" and the right-making relation which will end: "So I ought to 
j l Interestingly enough in Johannesburg one can buy "spray on dirt" and "stick on mud" for a city dwelling 
off-road vehicle. 
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wash it" and "So I ought not wash it". We need to look deeper into the right-making 
relation and as to why it is important to make a distinction between the right-making 
relation and the favouring relation. 
Right-Making 
The right-making relation is an important concept to understand because it is an attempt 
to explain a moral relation. That is, it is at bare minimum the way in which particularists 
view a relation that explains how features stand in relation to rightness or wrongness. 
This as opposed to one which explains that which gives us an explanation of an ordinary 
relation of features which get us to do something. Dancy explains this as: "The relation in 
which features of the situation stand to an action when they make it right or wrong" . 
The favouring relation is of a different sort; it stipulates: "the relation in which features 
of the situation stand to action or to belief when they are reasons for doing one thing 
rather than another "JJ. Although these definitions are not specifically candid, they lead 
us along the right path. We would be mistaken to acknowledge that because a feature 
plays the favouring role it then must play the right-making role as well. 
The right making-relation, for the particularist, stands out from the favouring relation 
because, although both the favouring and the right-making relation work in a similar 
fashion, in some cases there are features which have no standing in relation to rightness, 
J" Dancy, J Ethics without principles, pg 79. 
JJ Dancy, J Ethics Without Principles pg 79 
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only to favouring. For example: that my leg is itchy favours my scratching it. This has no 
relation to Tightness, only to favouring. 
The two relations must then signify the different kinds of roles that features can play. 
Sometimes a feature does stand in relation to action such that is a reason for action whilst 
at the same time stand in a relation to Tightness such that it makes something right or 
wrong. However, this cannot always be the case because, wherever there is a feature that 
plays the favouring role, it does not mean that doing that action will be right, like 
scratching my itchy leg. However, the favouring role must be implicit in the right-making 
relation. That is, there must be a favouring relation in the right-making relation, because 
if there were not then we would have no reason to do the right thing. 
We can quite easily put both of the distinctions into two particularist friendly examples: 
John hears a song he likes, he has reason to sing along (the song he likes and hears 
counts in favour of his singing along). That John's song is playing does not stand in 
relation to Tightness. 
John is in church, the congregation begins to sing a hymn, he does not know the hymn 
nor does he like it. The congregation singing a hymn bares the right-making relation to 
singing, however it does not bare the favouring role because it has been disabled by his 
lack of enthusiasm for the song and his lack of knowledge of the song. 
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It is then not only features that play the favouring role that can change their valence, but 
right-making features too. For particularism these are two separate relations in moral 
judgement and moral thought, even though the right-making relation embodies the 
favouring relation. 
Generalism agglomerates these two relations into principles or reasons which are 
incarcerated into principle-type rules. For particularism, the difference in valence that 
each feature holds case to case is held together by the view of contributory reasons. This 
is supposed to lead us to a holistic view of reasons. Holism in the theory of reasons holds: 
"a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason, or an opposite reason, in 
another" . 
Again, we must flag this point in the form of a question: If I want to hold contributory 
reasons, do I need to hold a concurrent view of particularism and holism? Dancy suggests 
that we do, his view demands that we need both. Not only because the view sees 
contributory reasons as normatively basic, but because contributory reasons account for 
the variance of valence and that reasons themselves are largely variant. 
I do not believe that we need to go this far, I am sure that we can quite comfortably hold 
contributory reasons or at least a variance towards reasons which captures the normativity 
in such a way that reasons are normatively basic, from a Rossean or a cluster atomistic 
view (this will be explained properly later). My point is, I am sure that we will see that 
j4 Dancy, J Ethics Without Principles, 74. 
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there is a way to hold contributory reasons and variance of reasons without claiming that 
reasons are completely particular from case to case. 
I think that this comes largely from cluster atomism, as we shall see: that where there are 
the same, or at least similar, features in separate cases they must combine and thus 
contribute in the same way. They will thus be on the same side of the favouring role and 
the overall reason will not change its valence. I think that this will be expressly clear in 
the need for an account of justice, as we shall see. 
For the moment however, we must see how holism is supposed to capture our intuitions 
surrounding contributory reasons. If it does this then we can set aside my intuitive 
complaints that have cropped up so far. For this reason, the following section on holism 
is structured in such a way that we can see holism for what it is, and then see how it is 
supposed to be superior to the available forms of atomism. All the way through this 
section we need to keep in mind that particularism is to holism as generalism is to 
atomism. 
Holism In The Theory Of Reasons 
Holism in the theory of reasons states: a feature that is a reason in one case may be no 
reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another. It is the central view which particularism 
holds. It is held by particularists in order to account for the variance of reasons. It is also 
important to our discussion in light of the claim that Dancy makes: because atomism is 
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false of reasons, as this is the central theory of reasons that generalism holds, then 
generalism too is false. 
Dancy's first move is to set out how the different sorts of reasons work. That is, he looks 
at whether holism is true of each of them. Basically Dancy hopes to find that all of these 
reasons function holistically. To do this he looks to find which of them are variant, i.e. 
whether their valence can change from case to case, and then, if we need holism to 
understand all reasons including moral reasons. So the following part of the paper is 
broken up into subsections in which the following reasons are viewed: Theoretical 
reasons, Ordinary practical reasons and, lastly, moral reasons. 
Theoretical reasons 
Theoretical reasons are reasons for belief, that is, reasons for believing something. That 
my car will not start is reason for me to believe that my car is broken and needs a service. 
If theoretical reasons function generally or atomistically then, that my car will not start, 
must always be a reason for believing that it is broken and needs a service. However, this 
cannot be true, I could just be out of petrol, or somebody could have stolen my engine or 
I might be using the wrong key. So, that my car will not start might be a reason for a 
variety of other beliefs other than that it is broken and needs a service, it is thus a variant 
reason. 
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Dancy claims that it is thus uncontentious to claim that theoretical reasons function 
holistically. He claims that if generalism held that theoretical reasons functioned 
atomistically it would be undeniably false. However, this is not so, no one actually 
defends a view of theoretical reasons which mirrors the one above. In almost all views 
theoretical reasons function holistically. 
Ordinary Practical Reasons 
Practical reasons, as already established, are reasons for action. Ordinary practical 
reasons are non-moral reasons for action. Dancy claims, again, that it is uncontentious to 
say that holism is true of ordinary practical reasons. He claims that no one denies this 
point, or at least no one that he is aware of. We can easily give examples to show this. 
That it is cold outside is sometimes a reason to go outside, and sometimes a reason to stay 
indoors. Dancy demands that, because there are no other accounts of whether or not 
ordinary practical reasons function holistically, then even mere examples should be 
enough to secure that they are. 
However, there is one objection to this move, or one that could be made; one by Humean 
talk of desires. This view grounds all reasons in desires, thus ordinary practical reasons 
for the Humean are based on desires. This approach would allow ordinary practical 
reasons to function atomistically. It works in the following way: one only has reason to 
perform a specific act when one has the corresponding specific desire to do so. This will 
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mean that, where ever one has that specific desire, one has a specific atomistic reason to 
perform a specific act. 
As Dancy rightly charges, even if practical reasons are grounded in desires, "the same 
desire might not function as the same reason'"3. A desire in one case may be a reason for 
doing a specific thing, however in another the same desire could be a reason for 
something else. Here we can follow Dancy and view an example which shows this. That I 
have a really strong desire to drink beer can function as a reason for me to drink beer. 
However, my really strong desire to drink beer can also be a reason for me not to drink 
beer, because I have already had too much beer and my desire for more tells me this. 
Dancy seems reassured that putting enough examples of this sort out there proves that 
this view does not hold. Clearly, we can think of a variety of examples that oppose this 
view. The possibility of these examples, for Dancy, clearly shows that atomism in the 
theory of ordinary practical reasons is false even if a desire based view is adopted. 
Moral (practical) Reasons 
Most people, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, believe that moral reasons are just 
plainly different from other reasons. They must therefore be treated differently. The main 
thought is that these reasons follow principle-type rules or are in fact moral principles. 
This demands that moral reasons must be invariant. That is, they do not change their 
'^ Dancy, J, Ethics Without Principles pg 75. 
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valence case to case. Where something is wrong or right or good or bad, it must be this 
way in every case in which it occurs. 
Moral practical reasons are generally held to follow this behaviour because they are the 
basis of moral judgement and thought. I think, people would like to be able simply to 
make judgmental verdicts and condone certain actions on the basis of their being, or not 
being, in line with their own certain presupposed principles (think of every one as a moral 
critic). If something or some action does not fit with their own moral standards then they 
feel comfortable to pass judgement because of their pre-existing moral standards. 
With regards to the agent actually making decisions as to what to do in a moral case; 
principles make the agent more certain and comfortable with the choices that they can 
make, because it seems justified in terms of their pre-existing moral framework. The 
agent hopes that by referring to moral principles they can then say that what they did was 
right, just, good, bad etc. regardless of the actual outcome. 
In effect, making moral reasons invariant and thus atomistic or at least claiming that they 
are, makes it easier for people to make decisions, judge other peoples decisions and 
understand what they figure to be morality as a whole. 
Dancy, however, thinks it to be a far-fetched idea that moral reasons must work 
completely differently to all other reasons. That all the other reasons behave irregularly 
and hohstically should be reason to think that moral reasons are the same. He claims that 
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there is very little to persuade one, intuitively, to believe that moral reasons are rule-
bound and atomistic. He points to "the sad fact that nobody knows how to distinguish 
moral reasons from other reasons; every attempt has failed"j6. 
This is a huge disadvantage for somebody who wishes to defend a general, atomistic 
view of moral reasons. Because, if all other reasons are holistic and all moral reasons are 
atomistic and there is no way to distinguish between the two, it will be very hard to know 
which reasons to treat differently. It also makes it hard to say that there is a difference 
between the two category of reasons if no one has made a comfortable distinction. 
Dancy urges us to view, and thus treat, moral reasons the same as all other reasons. For 
Dancy they must be holistic and thus contributory. This implies that to make sense of 
contributory reasons we must be holists. To be holists, we must accept that reasons can 
vary their valence from case to case. If any reasons can vary their polarity case to case 
then we must reject all principles and be particularists. 
With this in mind the questions must be asked: if I want to hold all reasons as 
contributory, must I accept that moral reasons function holistically? If so, must I be a 
particularist? To answer these questions we need to evaluate the path that we have 
followed up until now. If we do this we should be able to find the point at which we had 
to reject an atomistic picture of contributory reasons. We will hopefully see that at that 
point, we can comfortably hold the generalist view of cluster atomism as a better option. 
j6 Dancy, J, Ethics Without Principles, pg 76. 
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I take it that all reasons are contributory. That is, although a single feature of a case can 
work on its own to count in favour of action such that it provides enough normative force 
for me to act, features of a case will usually count in favour of action, and combined 
together, contribute towards the final overall reason of the case. What I should do is 
determined by a combination of what the features of the case count in favour of doing. 
This is clearly, in my opinion, the right approach, but does it mean that these reasons 
have to be variant? 
Here is where the move becomes important. The contested point is whether the features 
playing the reason role can change their valence. If they are variant then we must hold 
holism to be true of reasons. One might think that we are at a dead end, particularism 
gives examples of moral reasons behaving holistically and generalism gives examples of 
moral reasons behaving atomistically. 
Dancy claims that although there are some moral reasons which function atomistically, or 
at least some invariant reasons, these are peculiar reasons which work only on their own. 
He does not divulge these reasons and he claims he does not really need to because the 
idea is if we accept that all reasons are variant then where some reasons are the same case 
to case, we don't need to treat them differently to all other invariant reasons. 
I think that this is true of all other reasons, that is, I think that all reasons are essentially 
contributory reasons. But the variant ones are ones of a different type; they are non moral 
reasons like theoretical or ordinary practical reasons. The initial thing that strikes me 
45 
about needing a distinction between moral reasons and other non-moral reasons is that in 
the case of other reasons, we seem to vest less importance. Our moral reputation hangs on 
the line of every moral case which we encounter. For this reasons, we seek out 
similarities to make our moral behavior, judgement and thought consistent with previous 
cases where we knew we were doing or did the right thing. 
This is not sufficient evidence that moral reasons are consistent or invariant or univalent. 
Rather it is evidence to say that they are on occasions. So at this point we can say that 
moral reasons are both invariant and variant. That is, at times they are variant and at 
others they are invariant. Basically, we cannot choose sides yet as we do not know 
enough about how moral reasons work. Before we take an atomistic or a holistic picture 
of moral reasons we need to see how different forms of atomism fare against holism. The 
one which succeeds should show us how moral reasons should be viewed. 
Holism V Atomism 
Dancy has set this conflict out in his chapter entitled "Can Holism Be True?"j7. In this 
chapter he looks at various forms of atomism which oppose his view of holism. Though 
not much is said about each of the following forms I explore, the section helps us because 
it gives us a starting point for discussion. Ultimately, we can see which fares better. 
37 Dancy J, Ethics Without Principles, pg 94-117. 
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Full atomism 
At it's most trenchant, atomism is the view that a feature that plays the reason role in one 
case, will play the reason role in all other cases it occurs in the same way. Dancy claims 
this form of atomism looks at only one feature at a time. It is false because of the 
distinction between enablers and favourers. 
First off, although I do not wish to defend full atomism, I do not see how this charge 
works against them. There is nothing that shows full atomism to fudge the distinction 
between favouring and enabling. If it does look at one feature at a time then, each feature 
will be looked at on its own, an enabler will thus not be seen as a reason. It could, thus, 
not be the case that full atomism fudges the distinction between favourers and enablers. 
Consider a non moral case, the dirty toilet example: from the perspective of full atomism, 
that I have cleaning fluid and a toilet brush, would not count in favour of my cleaning the 
toilet. It would be the only feature of the case that is actually playing the reason role that 
counts in favour if cleaning the toilet, that it is dirty. So does that mean that looking at 
only one feature which plays the reason is the right way to view reasons? 
Well, at a very basic level, it probably would be justifiable to say: that my toilet is dirty 
will always be a reason to clean it. That is, on its own, that my car is dirty will always be 
on the same side with regard to action. That it is dirty will probably always be some 
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reasons to wash it. Disablers and enablers are not included in this account, but it does not 
mean that they cannot be. The full atomist might say, in the case of the disabler, it doesn't 
stop the dirty car from playing the reason role. Rather, the full atomist might say that the 
reason remains but it is out-weighed by something else. 
This does not get around the problem. The problem remains: where there is a disabler; 
that my toilet is dirty simply cannot favour washing it. This makes sense, even if we 
agree that there is still some reason to do it after there is a disabler, it is outweighed by 
something else. The reason is disabled and thus is not able to count in favour of action. 
So, by attempting to resist the distinction between favourers and enablers, full atomism 
loses the very explanation needed to account for why reasons that are supposed to always 
count in favour of action, can in some cases, lose their favouring power. 
Before we continue with the conflict between holism and atomism, we need to look the 
now even more interesting concept of enablers and disablers one more time. That is we 
have seen how each of these are held to be a particularist concept. We have just seen full 
atomism fail because it resists this distinction. The following section looks at how 
enablers and disablers work in cases and looks at how they directly affect what is held to 
play the favouring role. The question is: do we need to hold these as separate parts of the 
case? Or do they work intricately together such that wherever they occur they will do the 
same thing? The answers to these questions lead us straight to the appealing view of 
cluster atomism. 
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Enablers and Disablers 
We need to establish whether an account of enablers and disablers is essential in 
discerning how features of the case come to favour an action. The main force behind this 
point is that it seems that enablers and disablers are now the cause of the variance in 
reasons. That is, it seems that reasons hold their valence case to case if there are no 
enablers or disablers. We can hardly imagine that where a feature that is held to always 
be in favour of action has nothing stopping it from doing so it can still change valence. 
Clearly, it will count in favour of action in the same way it did before. 
The reason (or favouring feature) only ceases to do what it normally does where it is in 
combination with another feature of the case which causes the reason to do something 
else. I must ask: does this mean that the reason changes valence? or does it change what it 
is completely? If we follow Dancy then we must say that the reason changes its valence. 
I'm not so sure this is the case. My point is, it is not that when you have something 
disabling your reason to x, you do not now have a different valence of the initial reason. 
Rather, what you have is something different, a new reason. 
Consider, that it is Sunday is a reason for me to go to church (let us imagine that I believe 
in God at this point which enables Sunday to count in favour of church going). Every 
week, on Sunday for the past 29 years, I have gone to church. So, that it is Sunday counts 
in favour of my church going. If I no longer believe in God then that it is Sunday will be 
disabled from favouring my church going habits. 
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Nobody would say that I am to blame for not going to church on Sunday because I no 
longer believe in god. Nobody would claim that I still have a reason to go to church 
because it is Sunday. The disabler in combination with the favourer now provides me 
with something else. It now counts in favour of not going to church. But this only makes 
sense when we put the two together. Before the disabler it made sense to say "that it is 
Sunday is a reason for me to go to church". Now I must say "that it is Sunday, and I have 
lost my belief in God, is reason for me not to go to church". 
This is interesting, it shows that a favourer must actually be viewed with the disabler for 
the reason to change valence. Reasons then only change their valence where some other 
feature of the case forces the favourer to do so. We can easily accept this from an 
atomistic picture, of this I am sure. We can see disablers and enablers as a functional part 
of the reason as a whole, as much as favourers. We must include the enabling and 
disabling features as part of the whole reason because they directly affect the way the 
reason works and overall what we have reason to do. Basically what I expect to see is that 
it is the favourer and not the reason as a whole which changes valence. What it will mean 
is that we can take more from an atomistic view than has been granted by its opponents 
like Dancy. 
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Chapter IV: Cluster Atomism 
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Consider cluster atomism, the view that holds that we take all the relevant features of the 
case in clusters and the whole cluster is the reason. We can then find, through the 
combination of all the relevant features, what we have overall reason to do in the case. By 
overall reason, I mean where the normativity comes down. The relevant features of the 
case can be viewed as contributory reasons (favourers), enablers, disablers etc. Each of 
these, combined together, play a pivotal role in producing what you have overall reason 
to do. 
The cluster atomist does not look at each feature separately, only in combination with the 
other features of the case. This is important; for the cluster atomist, you can only learn 
what reason you have by looking at all that is relevant to the case together and not 
separately. The point is, where a feature that is a disabler combines with feature that is a 
contributory reason you have a set reason, not the same feature with a different valence. 
The crucial point is that if we reproduce all the relevant features of the case into another, 
we will have exactly the same overall reason as the initial case. This is intuitively clear, 
there is very little or no reason to believe that if the relevant features of one case are 
mirrored in a future case the reason will not be the same. 
Cluster atomism is strengthened by the idea that enablers and disablers, where they 
appear, must be viewed at the same time as and in contrast to the favourer. As we have 
seen, enablers and disablers directly affect the favourer. They are then directly 
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responsible for the valence of the reason as a whole. Thus they are relevant features of 
the case and are thus part of the cluster of features that make the overall reason. 
The point is: we make sense of how a feature favours only with the enabler or disabler in 
mind. They are thus necessary in making sense of the role the favourer plays in the case 
and thus the reason as a whole. They must then be part of the reason and not a feature 
outside of reason. 
It is clear then that we can follow this view to see reasons as atomistic. If what a reason is 
must include all the relevant features of the case combined, we will only have this same 
reason where the relevant features of the case mirror a previous case. Then all other 
clusters with the same feature that do not have the other same relevant features are not the 
reason with a different valence, but, a different reason all together. 
So for the cluster atomist, reasons follow as atomistic. They do not change their valence. 
Where the same feature recommends a different action, it is because of its combination 
with other relevant features of the case. The other features of the case force us to treat the 
feature differently and thus provide us with a new, or different, reason altogether. 
Dancy initially attacks this un-fleshed out and conceptual level of cluster atomism on two 
counts. The first sees Dancy claim that in rejecting full atomism, as the cluster atomist 
does, "we have to allow that the polarity of each separate feature in the cluster could be 
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affected by changes elsewhere" . On the second count: even if we do have a case which 
mirrors all the relevant features, we cannot be certain that what was relevant there will be 
relevant here. 
Both of these criticisms are aimed at directly affecting what the cluster atomist takes to 
be true. On the first count, Dancy demands that changes outside of the cluster must affect 
the features inside the cluster resulting in changes in valence of these features. More 
importantly for Dancy, what he takes to be the favorers in the cluster of relevant features 
can be affected by changes elsewhere. This means that the valence of the reason can 
change even though the relevant features are the same as in the previous case. This is 
held by Dancy to dramatically affect what cluster atomists take to be true: Where the 
relevant features of the case are the same as a previous case the reason must be the same. 
On the second count, for Dancy, even if we do have a case that has all the relevant 
features of a previous case, we have no guarantee that what was relevant in the previous 
case will be relevant in the present case. This is to say that, the particulars of the case 
may not be in line with the relevant features of a previous case even though it posses 
them. Some features may be more important in the present case than they were in the 
previous case. 
I think that although Dancy has an insightful view of reasons, he has missed the point of 
cluster atomism. Although the first count can be read two ways, neither affects cluster 
atomism. The first way suggests that changes outside the cluster must affect at least some 
j8 Dancy, J, Ethics Without Principles, pg 94. 
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of the relevant features of the case (which are in the cluster). Straight off the bat this is 
false, because if some changing thing affects the relevant features of a case then this 
changing thing must too be a relevant feature of he case. We cannot see that features 
outside the cluster are relevant. All the relevant features of the case must be part of the 
cluster. If these features are outside the cluster because they are new to the case then they 
are simply included in the cluster and will then be included in the overall reason that the 
cluster provides. If this is different to the previous reason, then it is a different reason not 
the same reason with a different valence. 
We can read the first count a second way: that features within the cluster can change 
valence and thus affect the valence of other features in the cluster. However, this does 
nothing to weaken cluster atomism, the features within the cluster can change in a new 
case. As we have seen , this can only happen where there are new relevant features in the 
form of disablers and enablers. Features don't just change polarity unless they are caused 
to do so by something else. So, this just makes a new reason, the relevant features are no 
longer the same as the previous case. What is a reason there is not the same as the reason 
here, the cluster of relevant features is different. 
On the second count; according to Dancy even if we do have a case which mirrors all the 
relevant features as a previous case, we cannot be certain that what was relevant there 
will be relevant there. This too is false, as we have already seen that where we have 
exactly the same relevant features in a case: we will have the same reason. It goes against 
our intuitions to claim otherwise. Think of it in terms of weights, maths, or anything that 
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can be clustered, For example; 2+55+23=80. The relevant features of this case are 2,55 
and 23, where they are clustered they will always equal the same number: 80. 
Joseph Raz is a cluster atomist who follows this view to what he calls the complete 
reason. I do not think we need to go as far as Raz but for the sake of seeing this view at 
work, I will discuss it and how Dancy attempts to refute it. 
A complete reason for Raz is: "all the facts that stated by the non-redundant premises of a 
sound, deductive argument entailing as its conclusion a proposition of the form "there is a 
reason for P to 0""J . This is clearly a form of cluster atomism, not quite what we have 
been discussing up until this point but still one which utilizes the concept of all the 
relevant features of a case resulting in an overall reason. 
Razz looks at the features of the case as premises, we have been looking at them as 
relevant features of the case. We can easily see how this will result in clusters. Dancy 
objects to Raz by use of two examples. The first an absurd charge which is supposed to 
show that the definition of a complete reason is fallacious: 
1. Someone in the room has reason to <D 
2. There are only three people in the room P, Q and S. 
3. Neither Q nor S has a reason to <D 
4. So P has reason to O 
j9 Dancy, J, Ethics Without Principles, pg 97. 
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He claims that there is no reason in these premises and the conclusion of the argument is 
"P has reason to <D". He claims that this is enough to make Raz's complete reason false. 
This is, however, incorrect. The argument does not utilise the type of premises that Raz is 
looking for. What Raz means by "all the facts that stated by the non-redundant premises 
of a sound, deductive argument" is something that includes the reason(s) for P to <D. 
Surely, the feature that favours the act must be included in the argument that ends there is 
a reason for P to O. 
As we have seen, cluster atomism demands that each relevant feature of the case must be 
included in the reason. In Dancy's next example which he uses to attack Raz's cluster 
atomism, he seems to leave this out. He states that the enablers are not held separately 
and are thus obliterated by their agglomeration with contributory reasons. In this case: 
1. He promised to do this 
2. He is capable of doing it 
3. His promise was not extracted by duress or subterfuge. 
4. What he promised was not immoral 
5. So: he has some reason to do this 
For Raz, the complete reason is the cluster of the four premises. Dancy charges, as per 
the previous paragraph, that this is to ignore the distinction between favourers, enablers 
and disablers. Complete reasons do this because enablers and disablers are part of the 
reason as a whole. Dancy demands that contributory reasons are forced to seem 
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incomplete on this view. That is, on this view they only make sense in conjunction with 
the disablers and enablers. 
I am of the opinion that this is false. The advantage of contributory reasons is that they 
can combine with other features of the case to produce an overall reason which capturers 
where the normativity comes down. So, in conjoining them with disablers and enablers 
you are not loosing any of the power of holding all reasons as contributory. On the 
contrary, you are utilising the strength of the view. 
Contributory reasons are reasons which contribute along with others to the overall reason 
in the case. We have seen how this works. There is no reason to say that disablers and 
enablers must be separate from reasons. They are part of the explanation of what the 
reason to <D is and why we have reason to O. If we do not include them as part of the 
reason then we have lost an important key to understanding why the reason is behaving in 
such and such a way. 
It is, further, my opinion that it is not the favourer that is the reason as Dancy seems to 
imply. The favourer is what provides the normativity or normative force to the overall 
reason, of this I have no doubt. However, the favourer in conjunction with all the other 
relevant features of the case make the overall reason. At least, where all the relevant 
features combine this is where the normativity comes down, this is the overall reason. 
This reason can contribute to the case along with clusters of other relevant features (other 
contributory reasons), if there are any, to provide for a further overall reason. 
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The terminology that I am using may be quite confusing at this point. I hope to provide 
clarity here where I explain all of the terms which refer to reasons. First off, as I have 
already admitted: All reasons are contributory. Even if a cluster of relevant features has 
an overall reason where the normativity comes down, it does not have to end here. These 
overall reasons can contribute towards a further overall reason with the overall of other 
clusters in the case. In a sense, the overall reasons from each cluster can create a further 
cluster where they contribute in combination with others. 
The main point which I have attempted to establish with the enlightenment of cluster 
atomism is: where the relevant features of a case, viewed in a cluster and as an overall 
reason where the normativity comes down, mirror a previous case then what was a reason 
there will be the same reason here. We can thus accept that there are, and must, be case to 
case regularities such that we can look at atomistic reasons for guidelines to thinking 
about what we should do. 
The discussion can now move to look at the issue of valence with regards to the concept 
of justice. In my opinion, justice is a consideration that will always stand in the same 
relation to action. That an act will be just will always favour some action if not demand 
it. At least it is hard to conceive of the idea that an act's justness could count against 
doing it. This is where cluster atomism, and the account invariant overall reasons it 
allows, come together to show why fully-fledged particularism cannot stand. 
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Chapter V: Is Justice Holistic and Particular? 
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The particularist thinks that the valence of any given feature is holistically determined. In 
this chapter I seek to establish whether this is indeed so. I do this by considering whether 
the fact that an act is obligated by justice is a consideration that will always count in its 
favour. Basically, I want to establish whether considerations of justice are holistic or 
atomistic. 
It is generally held that if something is just, it will always count in its favour. That is, we 
can hardly imagine a case where that something is just does not count in its favour. 
Particularists will resist this move, they want to say that all features, bar maybe a few, are 
holistic. Dancy attempts to refute this type of thinking in the beginning of Chapter Seven 
of "Ethics Without Principles". As a response to the adaptation of Ross' work by 
McNaughton and Rawling, Dancy moves to look at the possibility that justice could be 
variant. 
McNaughton and Rawling are particularists who aim at showing why we need to, and 
can, accept certain weak principles. According to them, if we see "principles as taking us 
from the non-ethical to the ethical, then particularism is the truth. There neither are, nor 
need to be, principles of this sort ". What there are, however, are 'intra-ethical' 
principles, like justice, which take us from one normative concept to another. These are 
normatively thick terms like the six prima facie duties that are set out by Ross. 
McNaughton and Rawling suggest that these intra-ethical principles are essential to moral 
thought and judgement. We need to be able to move from one concept to another, and 
40 Dancy, J Ethics Without Principles pg 121. 
61 
these "infra-ethical", or weak, principles do this. For example "just deeds are right", this 
principle takes us from the concept of justice to the concept of right. 
McNaughton and Rawling also suggest that "a moral principle may draw attention to a 
feature that is always relevant, and relevant in the same way, under certain implicit 
conditions"41. This might suggest that they occupy a generalist position, however they 
maintain that there are no principles which take us from the non-ethical to the ethical. 
However, it would seem that they are allowing for a fair amount of invariance in the 
theory of reasons; this amounts to atomism. This is understandable as much of their work 
is based on the work by Ross. Their particularism is thus in direct opposition to Dancy's 
particularism which has at its core: holism. 
Dancy moves to refute this account by setting out Ross' six Prima facie duties and then 
setting them aside. He says that the only one that could possibly be invariant; the prima 
facie duty of justice. That is, he finds that none of the others will always stand in the 
same relation to action every time they occur because there are many examples that can 
prove each of their variance. Prima facie duties, other than those of justice, are not 
invariant reasons, they are merely duties. On his picture then, Dancy feels that he does 
not have to take them seriously. The only prima facie duty he feels he needs to take 
seriously is justice. 
Dancy admits that it is possible that justice always counts in favour of acting. 
Nevertheless, he puts two charges against justice. The first sees Dancy claim that there 
41 McNaughton, D, and Rawling, P, Unprincipled Ethics in Moral Particularism pg 269 
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are many just acts that we could do, but we have no reason to do these acts. This would 
be a good line to take could it be got to work. If there were many just things to do and we 
had no reason to do them, then indeed it would cripple an atomistic picture of justice. 
The above argument would, however, at the same time, cripple any picture of justice. 
Justice would then no longer be what anybody thinks it is. Instead, Dancy formulates his 
own reply in which he says that it might be that it is really injustice that is invariant and 
not justice. That is where there is a possible act that would be unjust, we ought not to do 
it, in every instance and in every case. 
This leads Dancy to his second charge: "In certain contexts such as ordinary family life 
the question whether what one proposes to do would be just or unjust 'does not arise', as 
it were, the wrong question to ask"42. He explicates that it is not that "the domain of the 
just/unjust distinction"4j does not include family life rather it just doesn't work the same 
way. This implies that this would be a very strange environment in which to organize a 
family. This is true. It would be strange if one approached family life with justice like a 
court or something of the like. His point is that justice varies according to context. Thus 
justice must be variant if it is not the same in every instance it occurs. 
Dancy claims that even if he is wrong here (that justice is contextually variant), all that 
would be left is "a concept that plays an invariant normative role as a reason giver"44. 
This is not evidence that there must be more of these concepts, as McNaughton and 




Rawling suggest. So Dancy rests happy that he has shown that justice does not prove to 
be a problem for his particularism, even if it is invariant (though he thinks it otherwise). It 
just means that there is at least one, strange invariant, reason. 
What can be said about these attacks on the invariance of justice? I think that Dancy is 
right when he says that it might be that it is in fact injustice that is the invariant reason. 
Our primary concern of what the just thing to do is. However, this can only make sense 
where there are possible injustices. That is, where there are possibilities of injustices; we 
have a prima facie duty of justice to prevent his prom happening. 
This aside, we need to look at and flesh out exactly what Ross sets out to be prima facie 
duties of justice before we can mitigate the damaging effect of Dancy's argument. 
"(3) Some (prima facie duties) rest on the fact or possibility of a distribution of 
pleasure or happiness (or of the means thereto) which is not in accordance with 
the merit of the person concerned; in such cases there arises a duty to upset or 
prevent such a distribution. These are duties of justice." 4" 
If we read the above quote we can see that the duties of justice of which Ross is speaking 
are deeper that those of which Dancy speaks. Firstly, Ross talks about preventing 
injustices as duties of justice. This implies that justice must be dependant on an the 
invariant concept of injustice to obtain its reason giving-power. These duties which Ross 
is spelling out are duties to prevent injustices from occurring. 
43 Ross, D The Right and The Good pg 21. 
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So, for Ross, prima facie duties of justice are aimed at securing justice, because of the 
features of the case that could lead to injustice. So, what Ross means by this quote is that 
where certain relevant features require a just action in order to maintain or prevent an 
injustice in a distribution of happiness and or pleasure, these are just acts. 
Does this mean that justice can still be contextually variant? If we read this quote closely, 
it is very hard to find any evidence to say that it must be. That is, justice must be the same 
in the home as it is elsewhere, on this account. It is not, however, explicit on this matter. 
So what could we expect were justice to be contextually variant? It would be a strange 
sort of conclusions in a theory of justice to say, justice is but not the same in the 
home, parking lot, dentist room or parent teacher conference. In these areas justice is 
this.. .which is different to that... 
Even so, let us imagine that Dancy is right. Justice does not apply to the home because of 
its contextual variance. Let us also hold that it is really injustice that is the invariant 
reason here. This means that, on Dancy's picture, justice must be based on injustice, or be 
required by injustice to repair or stop the injustice. Thus on Dancy's picture, injustice too 
must not apply to the home and ordinary family life. 
On Dancy's concept of duties of justice then, where there are injustices, they might not 
apply. Justice is contextually variant, and because it is based on injustices, then so too 
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must injustices be contextually variant. We thus have no reason to act on or even consider 
them, on every occurrence. 
Surely, we cannot accept that injustices are acceptable in the home, or in ordinary family 
life or in any context for that matter. Injustice must always be a reason for duties of 
justice. Dancy's account falls apart, the argument that justice is contextually variant 
doesn't stick because of the distinction between justice and injustices. Duties of justice 
must be required in every occurrence of features of injustice. This means that both of 
these duties, reasons or what ever one might call them are not contextually variant. 
So what now if we follow Dancy? On his terms we must be left with a concept that plays 
the invariant normative role as a "reason-giver". 
This implies that justice is a feature of the case, one that gives us a reason. On Dancy's 
account of reasons this must mean that justice is a favourer. I disagree; I don't think that 
justice is itself a feature of the case. I think that it applies to features of the case, like 
injustices or the possibility there of, but it is not itself a feature of the case. Concepts 
cannot be reasons and reasons cannot be concepts. 
I return now to my previous endorsement of cluster atomism. Here, it is held that it is not 
simply the favouring feature that is the reason, as Dancy would have us believe. It is all 
of the relevant features of the case combined into one cluster. The cluster is the reason 
where the normativity comes down. I suggest that if we follow cluster atomism we will 
understand reasons far better than the particularist. 
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First off, seeing as we have just established that justice must be atomistically determined. 
We can account for this far better than the particularist who has to make special 
conditions so that they can hold an invariant reason. Rather, the cluster atomistic view 
sees justice the same way as those who write about and apply it to real cases and to real 
institutions. We can also easily accept theories like that of Rawls without worrying that 
the concepts of justice are absolute or universal. We can see that justice works in the 
following manner. 
All of the relevant features of the case combined in a cluster can promote a just act. In 
fact, it would be strange if it was only one feature of the case, the favourer, that ends up 
in requiring a just act. The fact that justice demands the same action in all cases that have 
the same relevant features provides for a better account of justice than claiming that it is 
merely one feature that will always demand the same action: the feature of justice as a 
concept. 
It seems then that there is a strong case that Ross' prima facie duties of justice are 
atomistic. Justice is not holistic and particular, it is invariant, atomistic and general. 
Therefore, at this point, the theory of prima facie duties stands on only one leg, justice. 
Obviously, this is not enough to say we can now hold the whole theory. So the Question 
must be asked: is justice the only leg to stand on that is atomistic and invariant? 
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If we accept the cluster atomistic view, then I am sure that we can resurrect other prima 
facie duties that Ross puts forward . This can be resurrected as a response to the 
arguments put forward by Dancy. 
Firstly, with regards to invariance of prima facie duties other than justice, Dancy does not 
put forward much in the way of argument. His primary attack is the assertion that Ross 
must surely be wrong; Duties 1,2,4,5 and 6 are just not examples of invariant reasons. 
Dancy specifically sets each one out starting with duties grounded in previous acts of my 
own (fidelity and reparation) and previous acts of others (gratitude). Dancy explains that 
no act can be right simply because it rests on previous acts of others or my own. He 
writes off beneficence and non-malevolence as variant reasons because they do not 
always provide us with a reason to do them just because they are there. In his words: 
There are many acts that would benefit others that I have no particular duty or 
reason to do, and in any such case the act would not even be for the better. If 
someone does not deserve a benefit, giving her that benefit is not something we 
have a prima facie duty to do, the same mutates mutandis applies to those who 
have lost a certain immunity to harm.47 
This is to say that these duties are just implausible as invariant reasons. That does not 
mean that they are never reasons. For Dancy, they can be features which play the 
I have set these out in the previous chapter 
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favouring role, but they cannot always be duties, or considerations which are always for 
the better. 
With regards to prima facie duties of self-improvement Dancy simply concludes: "an act 
that is a duty to oneself is not a duty for that reason" . Which shows that it is pointless 
as an invariant reason. Again, it may be a reason in some cases, but not a duty in all. 
I do not think that Dancy has looked at prima facie duties as they should be viewed. 
Firstly he is looking at each one as a reason on its own, in his terms: the favourer. This 
favourer then is in line with one of the prima facie duties or is mandated by the prima 
facie duty. Dancy then places onto this "reason" a disabler or an enabler that changes the 
valence of one the single feature that is supposed to be playing the reason role (the one 
that is normatively basic). The valence changes and Dancy is thus sure that each one of 
these prima facie duties is defeated as a variant reason. 
It doesn't work this way at all. If we turn again to cluster atomism, we will have a strong 
response to these arguments. Let us start from the beginning: with previous acts of my 
own and previous acts of others. Now, assuming that I have made a promise, I would 
have a prima facie duty of fidelity to keep this promise. This is because the prima facie 
principle of fidelity applies to promise keeping. Now Dancy's favorite counter example 
to this is that my promise was made under duress disables my promise from playing the 
reason role. It does not stop my duty to keep the promise. What I now have is a duty to 
keep the promise but no reason to. 
48 Dancy, J Ethics Without Principles pgl20 
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This falls apart if we take the view of cluster atomism, because the reason is not the 
promise; the reason is the cluster of relevant features in the case. That my promise was 
made under duress is a relevant feature of the case so it must be part of the reason. In 
conjunction with the promise the duty and the reason to keep the promise falls away. In 
terms of my generalism chapter: prima facie duties hold unless relevantly different 
conditions apply. Here, with my forced promise, relevantly different conditions do apply. 
Thus the duty and the reason fall away. 
The reason does not change valence because the "favourer" is not the reason. The reason 
is the cluster of all the relevant features of the case. The prima facie duty of fidelity does 
not apply. What we now have is the knowledge that, in future cases. Where I make a 
promise under duress, I have no reason to keep the promise and I have no duty to keep 
the promise. 
What about acts of reparation? On Dancy's account, something cannot be right simply 
because it is an act of reparation. I don't think that this is the case. Again, cluster atomism 
can sort this out. The relevant feature of a case that the principle applies to is not the 
favourer; say "that I smashed his car". It is all the relevant features of the case combined 
together in a cluster. 
For Dancy, if I smashed his car but it was his fault, then I have no reason to repair his car 
but I have the prima facie duty to. This too is false. The reason is the cluster of all the 
relevant features. Again, the disabler (it was his fault) is a relevant feature of the case an 
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is thus part of the cluster and then part of the reason. The disabler, then, in conjunction 
with the feature "I smashed his car" is not a reason, nor a duty to repair it. 
In light of the above counter arguments, Dancy's criticism of duties of beneficence and 
non-maleficence no longer hold. It is true, however, that if someone does not deserve a 
benefit, giving her that benefit is not something that we have a. prima facie duty to do. 
Clearly, if we hold the cluster atomistic picture, this is not a problem. Here not only do I 
have no duty to give her the benefit, but no reason either. This is supposed to be a 
criticism from Dancy, but in fact it does nothing. That she does not deserve the benefit 
will be part of the cluster of relevant features of the case. Where these combine, this 
feature will stop any possible overall reason to give her the benefit. It will also stop the 
duty of beneficence from applying to the case. There really is no problem here. 
Take the next prima facie duty: Non-maleficence. Dancy briefly bumps it out of the 
picture of invariant reasons. He says that someone through their own acts has lost there 
immunity from harm. This means that there is reason for them to receive harm, but a duty 
to protect them from it. Again, if we pair their actions with all the other relevant features 
of the case, then it can be that there is no reason to protect her from the harm and no duty 
either. 
Lastly, Dancy tackles the prima facie duty of self-improvement in respect of virtue or 
intelligence. He says "an act that is of a duty to oneself is not a duty for that reason."49. 
49 Dancy, J Ethics Without Principles pgl20 
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This is true, we could not say that because a I have duty to myself, does not mean I have 
reason for it to be a duty. This is a puzzling conclusion from Dancy. He would not say 
that a duty is a reason, neither would the cluster atomist. Nevertheless, let us try to flesh 
this out to see if an example clears this puzzle piece. 
To improve my own intelligence, I ought to read more. Improving my own intelligence is 
a duty I have to myself, here, it is also the reason for reading more. Admittedly then, 
there must be a confusion here between reason and duty. Improving my own intelligence 
is always for the better. I cannot think of a counter example to this. That "by reading 
more I can improve my own intelligence" is the whole reason for reading more. It is the 
combination of the relevant features of the case. The prima facie duty of self-
improvement applies to this reason. The duty is not the reason; they just seem to coincide 
here. That does not provide evidence that I can't have a duty to my-self, nor does it prove 
that duties to myself are variant. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
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In the last chapter, we saw Jonathan Dancy attempt to explain justice from a particularist 
view. His attempt failed for a variety of reasons. The first was that, on his picture, for the 
generalist it must be injustice that is really the invariant reason, not justice. Then also on 
his picture, justice must also be contextually variant because in places like ordinary 
family life justice does not always apply. 
On my picture this is false. The two claims are incompatible. We cannot hold them both. 
If we did, then we would have to accept that injustice in ordinary family life does not 
always apply either. Surely injustice is not something that we can accept in family life, or 
in any context for that matter. 
This is because features of injustice, or the possibility there of, demand prima facie duties 
of justice every time they occur. If some other feature of the case disables this feature 
from obligating acts of justice, this must then be part of the reason. It must be part of the 
reason because it is a relevant feature. Then all it does is cancel that feature of injustice 
from being unjust, and effectively preventing the need for acts of justice. 
So, the reason doesn't change valence because there was no reason before the 
combination of the relevant features. Only where the normativity comes down, once the 
whole cluster of relevant features is viewed, do we have a reason. I suggest that it is here 
that we need to examine if reasons can change their valence. I don't see this as even a 
remote possibility. Any feature of the case that might change the valence is already part 
of the cluster because of its relevance. 
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I think that here, by giving a false account of justice, Dancy's picture is at a grave 
disadvantage. What can we expect a theory of moral reasons to tell us if it cannot 
adequately explain how justice works? I think what we have is an unreliable view of 
moral terrain, because the way we view justice signifies that it must be an important 
feature of the moral terrain 
Where I applied this type of thinking to the other prima facie duties which Ross 
promotes, I found that if we hold this view of reasons, the cluster atomistic view, we can 
similarly resurrect the other prima facie duties held by Ross' from the opposing 
arguments that Dancy provides. 
I think that cluster atomism jumps straight to the heart of the conflict between 
particularism and generalism. That is, the distinction between favourers and 
enablers/disablers. The particularist endorses this distinction because it allows for 
variance of reasons. On this view the favourer is the reason. The enabler\disabler either 
allows that favourer to hold its valence or it changes its valence. This means that 
favouring features can change valence, thus reasons can change valence. 
This is not the truth, features that play the enabling/disabling role directly affect the case, 
they cannot thus be separate from the reason. They must be part of what ever overall 
reason we have in that case. Thus, in leaving enablers and disablers out of an explanation 
of a reason, we cannot make sense of what that reason is. 
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The next step is to pick out that, where these relevant features of the case mirror the 
relevant features of a previous case, we will have the same reason that we had there. It is 
then possible and useful to pick out case to case similarities, useful in that we can find out 
what to do by appeal to what has happened before. At the same time we can appeal to a 
principle of prima facie duty which incorporates these features as features which demand 
duties of this type. 
Where we are faced with new features, or a new combination of features, we can judge 
what to do by what the combination of all of the relevant features in this new case, not by 
only by what the favouring features recommend we do, for this would not give the whole 
reason. We can thus make principles on this, or judge future cases with the same relevant 
features in the same way. 
By reducing reasons to the basic features that count in favour of action, Dancy's 
particularism goes too far. It leaves out all the other, important, relevant features of the 
case which play a huge role inside the reason, as we have seen. If we see reasons 
properly, through cluster atomism, we see the reason as a whole. In comparison, Dancy's 
particularism leaves us with a thin understanding of how reasons work. 
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